Kennedy`s telephone conversation in the Oval Office with Eisenhower, shortly after Khrushchev`s news, revealed that the president had the ambition to take advantage of the Cuban crisis to ease tensions with Khrushchev and, eventually, with Cuba.  The President also stated that he believes the crisis will lead to direct military confrontations in Berlin by the end of next month.  In his meeting with Eisenhower, he also claimed that the Soviet leader had offered to withdraw from Cuba in exchange for the withdrawal of missiles from Turkey and that, although the Kennedy government had agreed not to invade Cuba, it was in the process of determining Khrushchev`s offer to withdraw from Turkey.  On November 20, 1962, the DEFCON 3 global status of the U.S. armed forces was restored to DEFCON 4. General Curtis LeMay told the president that the solution to the crisis was «the greatest defeat in our history»; He was in the minority.  He insisted that Cuba invade immediately from the beginning of the crisis and still advocated the invasion of Cuba, even after the Soviets had withdrawn their missiles.  Twenty-five years later, LeMay still believed, «We wouldn`t just have taken the missiles out of Cuba, we would have taken the communists out of Cuba at the time.»  Three days after Kennedy`s speech, China`s People`s Daily announced that «650,000,000 Chinese men and women stood with the Cuban people.»  In West Germany, newspapers supported the U.S. response by confronting it with the weakness of U.S. equities in the region in previous months. They also expressed fear that the Soviets would retaliate in Berlin. In France, the crisis succeeded on October 23 on the front page of all the daily newspapers. The next day, an editorial in Le Monde cast doubt on the authenticity of the CIA`s photographic evidence.
Two days later, after a visit by a senior CIA official, the newspaper accepted the validity of the photos. In France too, in the October 29 issue of Le Figaro, Raymond Aron wrote in support of the American response.  On October 24, Pope John XXIII sent a message to the Soviet embassy in Rome, which was to be conveyed to the Kremlin to express his concern for peace. In that message, he said: «We ask all governments not to remain deaf to this cry of humanity. Let them do everything in their power to save the peace.  On October 18, Kennedy met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, claiming that the weapons were only used for defense purposes. Kennedy did not want to reveal what he already knew, and in order not to panic American public opinion, Kennedy did not reveal that he was already aware of the weaponry of missiles.  Until October 19, frequent U-2 spy flights showed four intervention sites.  The world thought the crisis was over on October 28, 1962, when Khrushchev winked and the two men said they had reached an agreement. But it started again in earnest five days later, when Kennedy sent the Soviets a new expanded list of weapons he wanted to remove from Cuba. This list went far beyond the nuclear missiles that triggered the crisis.
The list is still classified as «secret» and includes surface-to-surface missiles, bombers, missile launch equipment and torpedoes, as well as a large number of support systems. Although U.S. experts were convinced that Khrushchev`s message was genuine, the hope for a solution was only short-lived. The next day, October 27, Khrushchev sent another message that any proposed deal must include the withdrawal of US Jupiter missiles from Turkey. On the same day, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft of the United States was shot down over Cuba. Kennedy and his advisers were preparing within days for an attack on Cuba as they sought a remaining diplomatic solution.